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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SALE OF SINGLE INSURANCE
POLICY IN STATE HELD SUFFICIENT TO CONFER
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATION
Plaintiff, a California resident, recovered a judgment in California as
beneficiary of a life insurance policy. The Texas court refused to enforce
the judgment on the ground that service of process on the insurer outside
California violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court held that even though the defendant
had no office or agents in California, and had never solicited or done any
insurance business in that state, the entry of the judgment did not violate
the requirements of due process. Mr. Justice Black based the decision
upon the facts that the policy was delivered in California, premiums were
mailed from there, and the insured was a resident of California at the
time of his death. The California statute' subjecting foreign corporations
to suit on insurance contracts with residents of the state, even though
process cannot be served within its borders, was held valid. McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
The problem involved herein is not at all a new one. It first came to the
attention of the courts in the latter part of the nineteenth century in
Pennoyer v. Neff.2 In that case the court was very strict in its require-
ments for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant. The defendant
was required to be physically present within the court's jurisdiction and
had to be personally served with process before the court could proceed
to enter an in personam judgment.
The mere transaction of business in a state by a nonresident natural
person does not imply consent to be bound by the process of the forum.:'
The power of a state to exclude foreign corporations, although not abso-
lute, is the ground for an implication of consent.4 The requirements for
obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations have always
arisen from their doing business within the state. The courts have always
been hesitant to allow acquisition of jurisdiction over such corporations
unless the business carried on within the state is continuous and systematic.
The foreign corporation was usually required to have an agent physically
present within the state who could be served on behalf of the corporation.5
I Cal. Ins. Code (West, 1953), §§1610-1620.
295 U.S. 714 (1877).
3 But cf. Nelson v. Miller, 11 111. 2d 378, 143 N.E. 2d 673 (1957). Consult 7 De Paul
L. Rev. 281 (1958) for a discussion of this case.
4 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919); Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold
Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
5 G. W. Bull & Co. v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 344 I11. 11,175 N.E. 837 (1931).
CASE NOTES
When the activities of the corporation in the state have not only been
continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, the
due process requirement of "presence" is satisfied. This is true even though
no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of
process has been given.6 This reasoning was used by the Supreme Court in
the familiar case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,7 where the
court said:
[D]ue Process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personarn, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have cer-
tain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."s
The judicial trend has been and still is toward putting corporations
upon the same footing as natural persons in regard to the jurisdiction of
suits by or against them. 9 Therefore, the same problems arise in connection
with corporations as with individual defendants. Whether due process is
satisfied in a suit against a foreign corporation depends on the quality and
nature of the corporation's activities in relation to fair and orderly admin-
istration of laws which it was the purpose of due process to insure.10
The courts often talk in terms of due process but are elusive as to its
requirements. The problem is one of ascertaining what "business" is suffi-
cient to satisfy due process. In some of the modern decisions, solicitation,
without more, constitutes doing business within a state when the solicita-
tion is a regular, continuous and substantial course of business."
In the McGee case, the Supreme Court held that mere issuance of one
insurance policy by a foreign corporation to a resident of California
established a substantial connection with that state sufficient to meet re-
quirements of due process. This is a further breaking away from the
stringent requirement of a systematic and continuous course of business.
In Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,12 the Supreme Court applied its
new concept of "doing business" to a foreign corporation which had no
office or soliciting agent in Virginia but issued a substantial number of
health insurance policies to residents of that state through the mails. The
6 Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909); Pennsylvania Lum-
bermens Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407 (1905); Connecticut Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 US. 350 (1882).
7 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 8 Ibid., at 316.
9 Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237
P. 2d 297 (1951).
10 Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 99 F. Supp. 237 (D.C. Ark., 1951); Harrison
v. Corley, 226 N.C. 184, 37 S.E. 2d 489 (1946).
11 Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F. 2d 511 (App. D.C., 1943); Perkins v. Louis-
ville & N. R. Co., 94 F. Supp., 946 (D.C. Cal., 1951).
12 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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case held that metaphysical concepts of "implied consent" and "prcsence"
in a state were not controlling, and where business activities reach out be-
yond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with
citizens of another state, courts need not resort to a fictional "consent" in
order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in the latter state.
In a recent case it was held that, " 'Such business' includes of course the
doing of 'any act whatsoever,' and this is the demand for and the receipt
of premiums, which serve to keep the policy in full force and effect....
[Doing business includes] the soliciting, making, or delivering of insurance
contracts in Tennessee, by agent, mail or othenvise."' 3
Because of this confusion, many states passed legislation especially aimed
at foreign insurance companies carrying on a large business through the
mails. This type of legislation was involved in the McGee case, which
subjected foreign corporations to suit on insurance contracts with resi-
dents of California, even though such companies could not be served with
process within its borders.14
The nature of the problem which such legislation is designed to correct
is fully described and discussed by Judge Medina in Schutt v. Commercial
Travelers Mutual Accident Ass'n' 5 where he said:
The background is the mushroom growth of the mail order insurance business.
Typically such companies maintain an office and own property only in the state
where they are incorporated, but they insure risks in many states, sometimes on a
nation-wide basis. They have no agents or solicitors. New business is secured
through the efforts of old policy-holders, or "members," spurred on by offers
of prizes and aided by advertisements and application blanks furnished by the
company. The amounts of money involved are small.. . , the various sums of
accident, hospital and health coverage running from a few dollars up to a few
thousand.... In any event, such has been the success of these companies and so
clear is the hardship of requiring the assured or his beneficiaries to hire a lawyer
to prosecute such small claims in a state far from the residence of the policy-
holder, where the necessary witnesses are generally to be found, that several
states have enacted legislation to protect their residents against the expense, in-
convenience, and injustice which are found to exist where such claims are re-
quired to be prosecuted in far distant forums.... Few if any activities within a
state touch the people so closely as do those of insurance companies. Here the
defendant has hit upon a way of transacting its business which reduces its con-
tacts with its policy-holder and its methods of obtaining new business to com-
munications by mail. But the result is precisely what it would have been if sales-
men rather than "members" procured new customers and if agents went from
house to house collecting premiums instead of the sending of notices and re-
ceiving remittances through the mail.16
18 Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Ass'n, 229 F. 2d 158, 161 (C.A.
2d, 1956).
14 Authority cited note I supra.
15 229 F. 2d 158 (C.A. 2d, 1956). 16 Ibid., at 159, 162.
CASE NOTES
During this long history of litigation the Suprenic Court has accepted
and then abandoned "consent," "doing business," and "presence" as the
standard for measuring the extent of state judicial power over foreign
corporations. A trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permis-
sible scope of state jurisdiction over such corporations. The McGee case
underscores this trend by minimizing the contacts needed for "substantial
connection" with the state.
CRIMINAL LAW-FAILURE TO REGISTER NOT PUNISH-
ABLE WITHOUT ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF
FELON REGISTRATION ORDINANCE
The defendant, Lambert, was convicted of violating an ordinance of
the city of Los Angeles requiring the registration of persons previously
convicted of a felony if they remained in the city for over five days. The
defendant was a resident of Los Angeles for over seven years at the time
of her arrest. Within that time, she had been convicted of forgery which
the State of California classified as a felony. She had not been registered
under the ordinance at the time of her arrest. The defendant was found
guilty and fined $250. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held
that although Blackstone's requisite of a "vicious will"' is not necessary
to constitute a crime, since conduct alone will often suffice, nevertheless,
where conduct wholly passive is involved-a mere failure to register-
there must be actual knowledge of a duty to register coupled with that
failure before a conviction under the ordinance could stand. The court
had to assume that the defendant had no actual knowledge of the regis-
tration requirement as she offered proof of this defense which was re-
fused in the California trial. The judgment was reversed. Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
Blackstone defined the requisites for public wrongs as follows:
For though, in foro conscientiae, a fixed design or will to do an unlawful act is
almost as heinous as the commission of it, yet, as no temporal tribunal can search
the heart, or fathom the intentions of the mind, otherwise than as they are dem-
onstrated by outward actions, it therefore cannot punish for what it cannot
know. For which reason in all temporal jurisdictions an overt act, or some open
evidence of an intended crime, is necessary, in order to demonstrate the de-
pravity of the will, before the man is liable to punishment. And, as a vicious
will without a vicious act is no civil crime, so, on the other hand, an unwarrant-
able act without a vicious will is no crime at all.2
Certain civil cases dispensing with the element of wilfulness involve
statutes enacted to protect employees or dependents of employees en-
gaged in hazardous industries operated by the defendant. The employee
1 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *21. 2 ]bid.
